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Corporate Governance, Regulation and Globalization: Lessons from Korea 
 
Abstract 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis South Korea introduced 
regulations to implement an independent director system. We investigate whether the 
significant changes affected firm ownership structure, in particular increases in foreign 
ownership of corporations.  
Research Findings/Insights: Using a unique dataset and panel data analyses for publicly 
traded Korean non-financial corporations we find that foreign investors place considerable 
value on the appointment of independent directors. An increase in foreign ownership, 
associated with an improvement in the corporate governance system, occurred after 
controlling home bias, firm size and firm performance. Further, the positive effect of an 
outside director system on foreign ownership was greater for independent firms than it was 
for conglomerates (chaebols) and their affiliates.  
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our results support the view that investors are 
attracted to firms with superior corporate governance, particularly those with higher levels of 
board independence. 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: An important implication of our research is that improved 
corporate governance will increase foreign investment.  It suggests that governments, 
particularly in emerging economies, should consider improving corporate governance 
regulations to increase the flow of foreign investment and stimulate the globalization of an 
economy. 
 
 
JEL Classification: G32, G34, G39 
 
Key words: corporate governance, independent directors, foreign ownership, bank ownership, 
Korea 
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INTRODUCTION 
Globalization has been a prominent feature of world economies, particular over the past two 
decades. In an economic context, globalization is the reduction of impediments to the flow of 
goods and capital across national borders.1 We investigate how changes in regulations in a 
country regarding independent directors of publicly listed companies impacts corporate 
governance practices, which in turn impacts dramatically on foreign investment.  
In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the South Korean government 
implemented a series of regulatory reforms that had a significant impact on corporate 
governance structures and increasing the independence of boards of directors. The objective 
was to strengthen corporate governance systems as a means to improve managerial 
monitoring, transparency and accountability. Adams (2011) and others note that more 
independent boards of directors should be more effective. Armstrong, Core and Guay (2011) 
find that increasing the proportion of independent members on a board increases its corporate 
transparency with value creating results. The aim of the requirement for Korean firms to 
appoint outside directors combined with strengthened minority shareholder rights was to 
improve managerial monitoring and curb entrenchment and expropriation by controlling 
shareholders. As a result, the corporate governance system shifted from the traditional bank-
dominated, relationship-based model - the insider model - towards an outsider model. In 
parallel with these new regulations and changes was the removal of restrictions on foreign 
ownership of South Korean companies. As a result of these dramatic changes, South Korea 
(hereafter Korea) provides a unique setting for us to test the relationship between corporate 
governance and foreign investment in the country’s publicly listed companies. 
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Our paper contributes to the corporate governance literature in that we relate corporate 
governance to foreign investment and further relate that link to its positive impact on 
globalization. 
The reforms in Korea have been the catalyst for numerous studies. Solomon, Solomon and 
Park (2002) report the results of a questionnaire survey that indicates strong support for 
improvement in corporate governanace and accountability among a sample of fund managers. 
Perhaps the most common empirical research design has been to investigate the impact of 
various dimensions of corporate governance on firm value. Choi, Park and Yoo (2007) study 
Korea over the period 1999 to 2002 and find that the presence of independent directors and 
the level of foreign and bank ownership impact positively on firm valuation. Other studies 
looking at firm value impacts include Black and Kim (2011), Cho and Kim (2007), Kim and 
Lim (2010) and Kim (2007). Chizema and Kim (2010) find that the representation of outside 
directors on a board is a function of company size, business group affiliation, poor prior 
performance, leverage and the extent of foreign ownership.  
Two studies of the experience in Korea are closer to what we investigate in our research. 
Rhee and Lee (2008) find that foreign ownership increases when outside directors have 
advanced foreign degrees, affiliations with government organizations and experience in the 
relevant industry. Kim et al. (2010) find that diffuse ownership concentration and a firm’s 
efforts to implement better corporate governance lead to higher levels of foreign ownership. 
In contrast with these papers, we directly associate the appointment of outside directors to 
increases in foreign equity ownership. 
Although the relationship between corporate governance and ownership has been the 
subject of numerous studies,2 few have examined the effect of governance on foreign and 
bank ownership. Most existing studies of corporate governance and ownership focus on the 
agency costs of a given ownership structure. Further, the issue of foreign ownership has not 
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been a particular focus despite its importance in the context of increased globalization. One 
exception is Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2008) who investigated the effect of increased 
disclosure on foreign investment. However, the nature of increased disclosure could have a 
homogenous effect on both local and international investors. By contrast, our main concern is 
to investigate the effect of changes in governance structure because the effects of 
government-driven reform could differ between domestic and international investors. For 
example, domestic investors are used to the traditional system and may underestimate the 
value of an improved governance system compared to experienced international investors. 
The Korean case is unique in that the reforms facilitated a shift in the corporate governance 
system from a bank-oriented insider model toward a more outsider model. Existing studies 
focus largely on developed economies with stable corporate governance systems. We 
examine the effect in an emerging market of substantial changes to governance structure on 
foreign and bank ownership.  
The first question of interest to our study is whether the dramatic change in the corporate 
governance system affected foreign equity ownership. In particular, we investigate whether 
foreign investors responded positively to the appointment of outside directors, which was the 
core element of the changes to the corporate governance system after the onset of the 
financial crisis. Improved corporate governance should reduce foreign investors’ investment 
risk. The home bias proposition and transaction cost theory also indicate that foreign 
investors prefer firms that have similar governance systems to that in their own countries.  
Secondly, we examine whether bank ownership has responded negatively to the change 
from the traditional bank-oriented insider model towards the market-based outsider model. 
Rent seeking theory, combined with arguments that support the Anglo-American system, 
suggest that the shift in corporate governance systems towards the outsider model may reduce 
the rents obtainable by banks. Unfortunately, our ability to test the impact of the move to an 
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outsider model is complicated by another government action in response to the 1997 Asian 
Crisis. The Korean government adopted the London Approach3 to the corporate restructuring 
the followed the 1997 crisis. This gave the banks a significant investment involvement such 
as through debt-equity swaps. Consequently, banks’ ownership of corporations increased 
sharply irrespective of their longer term investment strategy.  
We present the first Korean study on governance and ownership that uses panel data, an 
estimation technique that enables us to isolate both cross section and time series effects. Our 
estimation results indicate that an improvement in corporate governance, measured by the 
appointment of independent directors, helps to attract more foreign equity ownership. The 
Within estimate shows a strong positive association between the two variables. Further 
investigation demonstrates that the positive effect of the outside director system on foreign 
ownership is greater for independent firms than it is for chaebols, suggesting that foreign 
investors discount the effectiveness of outside directors for chaebols.4 The increase in foreign 
ownership is also closely associated with size, which may proxy for the home bias factor. Our 
results, however, do not support our expectation that the outside director system has a 
negative effect on bank ownership of corporations. None of our empirical tests on this issue 
are significant.  
Our findings are important in suggesting prescriptions for success in the process of 
globalisation. An improvement in corporate governance systems can facilitate capital 
mobility across countries. This finding is particularly relevant for emerging markets where 
capital costs in domestic markets are generally higher than in international markets. These 
findings are important given that emerging markets where investor protection is especially 
weak are also those markets where capital investment from abroad is particularly important. 
The next section reviews changes in the corporate governance system in Korea, focusing 
on board structure and the introduction of the requirement for outside directors. In the third 
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section we describe our research hypotheses for the empirical estimations. The fourth section 
describes the data and our preliminary analysis. The next section contains estimation results 
from the multivariate and unrestricted models. We present our summary and conclusion in 
the final section.  
 
REGULATORY REFORMS 
Changes in the Corporate Governance System 
There are four distinctive features to the government-initiated regulatory reforms of the 
corporate governance system in Korea. First, the restructuring of board composition requires 
the appointment of independent directors for publicly traded firms. The importance of 
strengthening the board of directors (BODs) will be greater in an economy where entrenched 
management has been the norm. Board members in Korea were typically appointed as part of 
the seniority-based promotion scheme, which is similar to the situation in Japan. This 
tradition had two implications for BODs’ poor corporate monitoring. First, the board size 
could become too large to be efficient, resulting in coordination failures, as confirmed by 
Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, Sundgren and Well (1998). The promotion-linked board 
structure also often results in another layer of hierarchy within the BODs. Thus, the check 
and balance mechanism could fail to work, and board members could tend to become a 
rubber stamp for management decisions.  
The amendment of the Listing Act (Article 88.2) in February 1998 requires companies 
listed on the Korea Exchange to have at least 25 percent outside directors on the BOD. To 
insure the independence of outside directors, the Act clarified the conditions for outside 
directors by excluding current and former employees of a company, family or friends of 
controlling shareholders (CSHs), and anyone who had a business relationship with the 
firm/business group.  
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Further to this statutory requirement, the announcements of a Code of Best Practice for 
Corporate Governance in September 1999 and February 2003 influenced amendments to the 
Securities and Exchange Act in March 2001 and December 2003 respectively. Large listed 
corporations with asset size greater than 2 trillion won (approximately 2 billion USD) must 
establish an Audit Committee and an Appointment Committee under the BOD with its 
members comprized mainly of outside directors. The 2001 amendment also requires that no 
fewer than half the board members of large firms should be outside directors.  
The amendment of the commercial code in December 1998 imposed the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty and introduced the concept of de facto directors (article 382). This strengthened the 
responsibilities of board members. The concept of de facto directors allows a judge to regard 
any senior executive members who control management and/or act in a management role as 
de facto registered directors who have legal responsibility for their actions. The objective is 
to prevent CSHs from exerting controlling power beyond their legal ownership. Further, the 
changes in relation to corporate governance include measures to protect minority 
shareholders, creating a market for corporate control, a legal requirement for enhanced 
transparency of information disclosure, and strengthening the external auditing process.  
The second feature is that the reform of the corporate governance system was entirely 
government-driven, with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development who supplied bail-out funds 
following the 1997 crisis.  
Third, the reform occurred within a relatively short period of time, allowing little room for 
industrial lobbying. A country’s corporate governance system is generally evolutionary rather 
than revolutionary, as it involves the rearrangement of institutional settings and the business 
culture. The recent experience of Korea is something of an exception. From an empirical 
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perspective, the Korean case implies the attenuation of the endogeneity problem associated 
with a change in the governance system.  
Fourth, the change in the governance system was from a relationship-based insider model 
towards an outsider model. Seeing the traditional relationship-based model as one cause of 
the 1997 crisis, the Korean government opted to move closer to the Anglo-American system.  
In summary, the reform of the Korean corporate governance system following the 1997 
crisis was characterized by the introduction of independent directors to the BOD, and this 
new governance system is largely in line with the Anglo-American outsider model as 
opposed to the traditional bank-dominated, relationship-based insider model. Foreign 
investors would be likely to evaluate this change in governance system as positive to the 
extent that the outsider model is effective in protecting minority shareholders. However, the 
watering down of the insider model might discourage banks from playing a role in the 
corporate governance system by reducing their rent-seeking activities.  
 
Changes in Foreign Ownership Restrictions and Market Integration 
In addition to the reform of the corporate governance system to strengthen the monitoring 
function of Boards and protect minority shareholders’ interests, the government also relaxed 
the remaining restrictions on foreign investment. Until the 1990s, the Korean government 
capped foreign equity ownership at ten percent with a view to protecting entrepreneurs. 
Hostile mergers and acquisitions (M&As), defined as attempts to obtain managerial control 
against the incumbent management’s wishes, were prohibited as an incentive for 
entrepreneurs to comply with national industry policy and the export-driven growth strategy.  
Extant literature suggests that foreign investors play a particularly important role in 
emerging markets because their participation promotes development by supplying capital, 
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spill-over of technology and managerial know-how, and competition to improve the 
efficiency of the markets (Bekaert and Harvey 2000; Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad 2001).  
The onset of the 1997 financial crisis and the subsequent reforms were a turning point in 
the relaxation of the restrictions on foreign ownership. The reforms in May 1998 removed 
regulations governing foreign investment in Korean firms, except for those industries that 
involve national security concerns or cultural considerations, such as the mass media. 
Foreigners can now purchase up to 50 percent of the outstanding shares of most public 
corporations. The reforms permit any type of M&As by both domestic and foreign investors, 
including hostile acquisitions.   
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2007) reported that the value 
of Korean firms sold in cross-border M&A was on average USD283 million per year between 
1990 and 1997, reaching USD10,062 million in 1999, and averaging USD4,882 million 
between 2000 and 2006. This level of annual cross-border M&A during the first half of the 
2000s was remarkable, as it represented an increase by a factor of 17 from the level before 
the crisis, compared to growth of 4 times for the world as a whole over the same period.  
The data on M&A activity is consistent with pent-up demand for investment in Korean 
companies prior to the relaxation of restrictions on foreign investment in May 1998. The data 
on foreign investment that we will show below in Table 1 indicates steadily increasing 
investment by foreigners from 1999 onward. We conclude that over our sample period of 
1999 through 2003, the increase in foreign investment unfolded systematically so that the 
investment decisions would have reflected full consideration of the developing improvements 
in corporate governance. 
In summary, the increasing foreign investment in the late 1990s and early 2000s followed 
the liberalization of foreign equity ownership and a relative improvement in corporate 
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governance systems to protect foreign investors’ interests, at the expense of the role of banks 
in corporate governance. This paper will investigate the relationship between these variables.  
 
EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESES 
Reform of the Corporate Governance System, Liberalisation and Foreign Ownership 
There were at least three major contributors to the increase in foreign investment. The virtual 
removal of restrictions on foreign investment opened Korea up to investment, although it is 
not clear that there was significant pent-up investment demand in 1997 except through M&A 
transactions. The sharp depreciation of the Korean won against major currencies following 
the crisis generated a wealth effect and thus improved the bargaining power of foreign 
investors (Froot and Stein 1991; Aguiar and Gopinath 2005). In addition, the changes in 
corporate governance would have reduced the perceived risk of investment in Korea for 
foreign investors. It is this third factor that we focus on testing as an explanation for the 
increase in foreign investment. We take the first two factors into account through the year-
specific effect and year-industry effect controls in our panel regression model. Year-industry 
effects control for time-varying industry effects, while year-specific effects capture exchange 
rate fluctuations which are homogenous across industries.  
The theory of corporate governance indicates that foreigners tend to invest more in firms 
with good governance to manage their investment risk (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et 
al. 2000, 2002). The ultimate goals of corporate governance include protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests and support for optimal performance. Foreign investors are more 
likely to be dependent on an effective corporate governance system than local investors, 
partly because foreign investors are usually minority shareholders. When international 
investors buy shares in a company, they face the risk that they may fail to realize an 
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appropriate return on their investment because of expropriation by local corporate managers 
or CSHs.  
The reform of the corporate governance system in Korea should change the risk to 
investors for a number of reasons. First, the new corporate governance system (including the 
appointment of outside directors) should increase the demand for capital. Castro, Clementi 
and MacDonald’s (2004) model illustrates that more effective corporate governance is likely 
to increase risk-sharing between insiders and investors in the company and thus increase the 
demand for capital. This risk-sharing is possible because investors’ repayment terms are tied 
to stochastic realisations, resulting in the transfer of the insiders’ idiosyncratic business risk 
to the investors. In addition to the demand side, improved corporate governance would 
stimulate a greater supply of capital from the market. In particular, increased demand would 
mitigate the diminishing marginal returns to investors, and therefore investors would be 
willing to supply capital to firms with good governance systems.  
According to La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) common law is better able to protect minority 
shareholders than civil law. The reform of the corporate governance system following the 
1997 crisis resulted in the adoption of more common law components than in Korea’s 
traditional civil law system. An important implication of the La Porta et al. argument is that 
improved protection of minority shareholders would reduce (global) investment risk of 
expropriation such as by tunnelling, thereby increasing the supply of foreign investment. In 
addition, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that independent directors have an incentive to 
establish a reputation as professionals in overseeing management because the value of their 
human capital depends on their performance in monitoring senior management.  
The introduction of an outside director system, which is at the heart of the Anglo-
American system, should improve the protection of minority shareholders’ interests from 
executive management and/or the CSHs’ expropriation. The OECD’s Principles of Corporate 
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Governance, announced in 1999, clearly indicate that the degree to which corporations 
observe basic principles of good corporate governance is an increasingly important factor in 
investment decisions. International investors require higher resource commitments than local 
investors and have a greater level of risk associated with investing in a foreign country with a 
less familiar environment.  
We expect the reforms of the corporate governance system in Korea to increase the 
independence of Boards of Directors. We also expect the relaxation of restrictions to increase 
foreign investment. Of interest is whether a firm’s appointment of independent directors 
attracts increased investment from foreign investors. We hypothesize: 
H1: The association of foreign ownership with the appointment of independent 
directors is positive. 
Bebchuck and Weisbach (2010) suggest that the board’s controlling function is even more 
important for a firm where there is a controlling shareholder. As described in the section on 
regulatory reforms, the co-existence of chaebols and independent firms is an important 
characteristic of the Korean economy. Chaebols contribute to the economy by providing 
internal capital markets and risk taking (i.e., long-term project investments), particularly 
during the early stage of development. A few of them including Samsung, Hyundai and LG 
have established their own reputations as global companies. As a legacy of the past 
development strategy, however, most CSHs of chaebols have strong control power over the 
groups and their affiliates in terms of strategic investment decisions and executive 
appointments. Circular-type cross shareholdings among affiliates create voting powers and 
strengthen the CSHs’ managerial powers even when the CSHs’ legal ownership is limited. 
Bae, Kang and Kim’s (2002) empirical study also reported tunnelling behavior of chaebols 
with resultant wealth transfers from minority shareholders to CSHs. Hence we hypothesize: 
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H1a: The positive association of foreign ownership with the appointment of 
independent directors will be smaller for chaebols affiliates than for independent firms.  
Transaction cost theory posits that foreign investors’ acquisition of local shares creates 
significant transaction costs such as searching, evaluating and actual trading. The home bias 
proposition extends this transaction concept to explain foreign investor behavior. Information 
asymmetry causes a barrier to foreign investors investing overseas. It follows that investment 
from foreigners is likely to increase when the costs caused by asymmetric information 
decrease (Dahlquist et al. 2003). Diamond (1985) and Lundholm (1991) also suggest that 
greater disclosure reduces the incentives for investors to pay for costly private information.  
The costs of international investment are greater due to the complexity of the foreign 
environment associated with differences in culture, language, political, and regulatory 
backgrounds and limited human networks. The international context of home bias suggests 
that foreign investors prefer to invest in firms they are familiar with and have a greater ability 
to obtain information about. The rationale behind this home bias behavior relates to the 
transaction costs caused by asymmetric information between domestic and foreign investors 
(Young and Guenther 2003) and differences in corporate governance (Dahlquist et al. 2003; 
Klapper and Love 2004). Foreign shareholders are often disadvantaged in overseeing 
executive management and/or CSHs’ actions and legal disputes with local residents. High 
information costs due to increased transaction costs discourage investment by foreign 
investors. Therefore, the sensitivity of foreign investors to the transaction costs associated 
with a company’s corporate governance will be more significant than that of local investors.  
H2: Firms with lower asymmetric information problems and more involvement in 
international business will have increased foreign equity ownership.  
Introduction of Outsider Model and Banks’ Ownership 
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The Principal Transactions Bank (PTB) System has traditionally been the framework for 
linking the banking and corporate sectors in Korea. It is similar to the Japanese Main Bank 
System where cross-holdings of shares are common. The PTB system in Korea created a 
form of bilateral monopoly between the banks and companies, calling to question its 
effectiveness in monitoring lenders (Nam 1996). Rent-seeking theory and capture theory 
(Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976) both posit that a monopolistic environment will lead to 
competition among economic agencies/organizations for rent through lobbying, bribing and 
political collusion. Agency theory also posits that executive management and/or CSHs can 
create rents at the expense of minority shareholders.  
One cause of the 1997 financial crisis was lenders’ moral hazard. Korean banks expected 
rents, given their established relationships with corporations. Political factors influenced bank 
lending criteria more than objective risk assessment. The resulting excessive level of leverage 
by firms increased their vulnerability to external shocks.5 One of the main tasks for managers 
in an emerging market is to secure financial resources. Thus, it is natural for managers to seek 
a share of the rents generated by lenders’ expropriation of minority shareholders’ interests.  
The reforms to corporate governance in Korea signalled a smaller amount of rent shared 
by lenders and borrowers. Banks’ share of the rents generated by borrowers after the 
governance reforms is likely to be smaller than it was before the reforms, if the generated 
economic rents are a positive function of a poor corporate governance system.6 Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
H3: The introduction of an outside director system will decrease the banks’ ownership 
of industrial corporations. 
 
DATA 
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We obtained the main data for our investigations from the Korea Listed Companies 
Association (KLCA) database, which has the most comprehensive coverage of listed 
companies on the Korea Exchange. Our sample covers the period from 1999, when the 
KLCA database began to publish information about outside directors, through to the end of 
2003, which was the most recent year for which data on bank ownership variables was 
available when we finalized the data in February 2011. Although the end of our data has been 
determined by data availability, it also marks a reasonable end point for our anaylsis. The 
sample period overlaps the most dramatic changes in the corporate governance system in 
Korea as described above. Also, it avoids any impact of the global financial crisis. Other firm 
characteristics are from financial statements in the KLCA database. The classification of 
chaebol affiliates follows the Korea Fair Trade Commission classification. Our final sample 
has 2,842 firm-years. 
Table 1 (upper panel) provides descriptive statistics on ownership structure and ratio of 
outside directors to total board members. The average ratio of appointed outside directors to 
total board members for the listed companies increased during the sample period from 10.47 
percent in 1999 to 31.23 percent in 2003.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
The lower panel of Table 1 and Figure 1 show both average and year-by-year data for 
share ownership by sector over the same time period. They show that foreign investors (7.06 
percent) ranked as the third most important share buyers, following individual households 
(61.74 percent) and other business corporations (20.35 percent).7 In contrast to overall trends 
in share distribution by sector, foreign equity ownership increased from 5.82 percent in 1999 
to 9.26 percent in 2003. Our empirical hypotheses focus on whether this increase is a result of 
17 
 
the deregulation of foreign ownership and strengthened minority shareholder rights, along 
with the introduction of the new corporate governance system following the 1997 crisis.8  
As mentioned earlier, the restructuring that followed the 1997 crisis gave banks a 
significant investment involvement in corporations. Table 1 shows that shares owned by 
financial institutions, consisting largely of banks, were 7.38 percent in 2002, almost twice the 
average share during our sample period. As the corporate restructuring that followed the 
crisis ran its course, banks were in a position to decrease their investment. The banks’ 
corporate ownership dropped sharply to 2.34 percent in 2003, which is consistent with the 
increased ownership being temporary. Banks were also likely to be timing the disposal of 
their shares to the improvement of market conditions in 2003 from the negative returns in 
2002. While the maximum values for bank ownership are higher than expected, around 85 
percent of firms have less than ten percent bank ownership.  
The ownership share of other business corporations in Korea remained at around 20 
percent. Ownership by other business corporations typically takes the form of circular 
interlocking shareholdings, creating the disparity between CSHs’ voting rights and cash flow 
rights. Figure 1 also indicates that securities companies and insurance companies have not 
played a major role in the share market in Korea. In contrast to transition economies, the 
consistently low level of shares held by government and public enterprises is due to the 
extensive privatisation process in Korea.  
In summary, Figure 1 illustrates that corporate ownership by individual households 
remained most important but declined significantly. Banks’ ownership also declined sharply 
in 2003, whereas ownership by other business corporations fluctuated slightly. By contrast, 
equity ownership by foreign investors, as the third most important group of buyers, increased 
during the sample period.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
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----------------------------------- 
Ownership by Foreigners  
We consider the following unrestricted baseline model for foreign ownership (Yit), which we 
measure as the foreigners’ share of a company’s total equity shares. 
Yit = constant + β1 Outsideit + β2 Book2Marketit + β3 Dividendit + β4 Leverageit 
+ β5 FinanDistrit + β6 ShareLiquidit + β7 CurrentRatioit 
+ β8 CSHsit + β9 CrossFirmit + Djt λjt + ωt νi + θt  + εit (1) 
The ratio of outside directors to total board members (Outside) is our measure of corporate 
governance. We chose this variable for two reasons. First, the introduction of the outside 
director system was one of the material changes following the 1997 crisis and is similar to the 
strengthened requirement for independent directors in the US following the Sarbane-Oxley 
Act of 2002. Second, the outside director data published by KLCA is less susceptible to 
measurement error than survey-based index numbers for overall quality of corporate 
governance.  
Froot and Stein (1991) demonstrated that exchange rate movements in a particular year are 
an important determinant of foreign investment. Aswicahyono and Hill (1995) also showed 
that industrial organization factors are important determinants of foreign investment. 
Assuming that exchange rate effects differ at the industry level, we include (SIC-2 digit) 
industry-year-specific effects, Djt, to control for the exchange rate effect and industrial 
organization factors. ωt ≡ {0, 1}. Thus ωt ≡ 0 and ωt ≡ 1 refer to the OLS estimator and the 
unobserved effects panel data model respectively. Given that ωt ≡ 1, νi shows the firm-
specific persistent (unobserved) heterogeneity affecting the dependent variable other than 
included regressors. Corporate culture and managerial style are typical examples. An 
advantage of this unobserved effects model is that it (i.e., the Within estimator) can control 
for firm-specific time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, which could be correlated with the 
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included regressors and thus resolves endogeneity bias caused by the omitted variable. θt 
controls for the year-specific effect (i.e., T-1 dummies), which is largely associated with 
macroeconomic variables. We expect these year fixed effects to control for changes in 
regulations on foreign ownership.  
A good corporate governance system requires more than just the appointment of outside 
directors (Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas 2010). If we assume that the contribution of outside 
directors is a function of the cost of acquiring information, a complex ownership structure 
among affiliates would reduce the effectiveness of outside directors. We therefore include 
two variables. First, we include controlling shareholders’ ownership (CSHs), calculated by 
the number of CSHs’ shares divided by the total number of issued shares. Bebchuk and 
Weisbach (2010) argue that the possibility of CSHs’ expropriation at the expense of minority 
shareholders in a family business group with concentrated ownership is even greater than the 
risk of an executive manager’s private consumption in a diffused firm. The second variable is 
cross-firm shareholding (CrossFirm), calculated as the number of shares owned by other 
business corporations divided by the total number of shares issued. As described above, 
cross-firm shareholding may be a barrier to the operation of the market, and thus the expected 
signs of CSHs and CrossFirm are negative.  
Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2009) suggest that leverage, book-to-market, and dividends are 
significant factors in explaining foreign investment. We include the book-to-market ratio 
(Book2Market) calculated as the book value per share over the year-end market price, and 
dividend payout ratio (Dividend), calculated as cash dividend divided by net profit. We 
regard that these two variables also proxy for growth. Miyajima and Kuroki (2008) also 
suggest that financial distress factors are important determinants. We therefore include both 
short-term and long-term financial distress variables. We measure Leverage as total liabilities 
divided by total book value of assets. We measure short-term financial distress with a binary 
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variable equal to one if a firm had losses for two consecutive years and zero otherwise 
(FinanDistr).9  
Market liquidity could also be an important consideration for foreign investors. Tesar and 
Werner (1995) report that the turnover rate on international equity investment is high, both 
when compared with the turnover rate in the investor’s home country and when compared to 
the market for the foreign security. Badrinath, Kale and Ryan (1996) and Falkenstein (1996) 
suggest that institutional investors prefer shares with higher market liquidity and lower return 
volatility. We include cash-convertability of investment, measured by the total value of 
shares traded over a year divided by the number of shares outstanding (ShareLiquid). Our 
estimation model also includes firm stability measured by the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities (CurrentRatio).  
We present estimation results in Table 2. Column (1) shows OLS estimates without 
considering firm-specific unobserved effects; that is, the value of ωt in equation (1) is zero. 
The remaining estimation results employ panel data analysis after switching the value of ωt to 
unity. For estimation purposes, we first treat the firm-specific variable νi as an (unobserved) 
independent variable and then apply the Within estimator method. The estimates are in 
columns (2) through (4). As a robustness check, we also treat the firm-specific variable as a 
part of residuals and use the (GLS) random effects estimator as shown in the last three 
columns.10  
The results in Table 2 support research hypothesis H1. The coefficients of the outside 
director variable are consistently significant with the expected signs, regardless of model 
specification. We particularly focus on the Within estimate results (columns 2-4) for our 
analysis.11 The estimated coefficients imply that an increase in outside directors/board 
members from the low to the high quartile would raise foreign equity ownership by 2 percent 
(=0.041*(33.0-0)/7.06). These estimated coefficients for outside directors remain intact even 
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when we control for variables (i.e., CSHs and CrossFirm) that affect the effectiveness of 
outside directors.12 This outcome suggests that foreign investors place value on the 
appointment of outside directors.  
Although there are a few significant results, none of the control independent variables are 
consistently significant. In contrast to Grinstein and Michaely (2005), our estimation results 
do not support the proposition that foreign investors are sensitive to dividend payouts. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Having observed the OLS estimation bias as decribed above and the restrictive 
assumptions for the random effects estimation, we include only the fixed effects panel 
estimations (i.e., models 2-4 in Table 2) in the following discussions. 
 
Chaebols vs. Independent Firms 
Tables 3 and 4 report the effects of governance on foreign equity ownership for chaebol 
affiliates and independent firms respectively (Hypothesis H1a).13 The estimation results 
support our hypothesis. First, the corporate governance variable (Outside) for chaebols is not 
significant in any model (Table 3). By contrast, the governance variable is positive and 
significant for the independent firms irrespective of model specifications (Table 4). This 
suggests that foreign investors value the effectiveness of outside directors more highly for 
independent firms than for chaebol affiliates where the chairman is able to exert strong 
control.  
The coefficients of controlling shareholders (CSHs) and cross-firm shareholdings 
(CrossFirm) are consistently negative and significant for chaebol affiliates. CSHs is 
insignificant for independent firms, but CrossFirm is negative and marginally significant. 
This result, coupled with the estimated coefficients of the corporate governance variables, 
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implies that foreign investors are concerned with CSHs’ power in relation to chaebols (i.e., 
the chairman or ‘chongsu’), and complex cross-firm shareholdings are impediments to the 
effectiveness of outside directors.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
Home Bias Proposition and Foreign Investment  
In line with transaction cost theory and the home bias proposition, our research hypothesis 
H2 suggests that foreign investors will invest in firms in a way that minimizes the transaction 
costs associated with asymmetric information and complexity in international business. Leuz, 
Lins and Warnock (2009) suggest that firm size is significant in explaining foreign 
investment. Dahlquist et al. (2003) provide results consistent with home bias being a function 
of factors that are related to size at a firm level. To examine hypothesis H2, we consider the 
size of the firm, calculated by the natural logarithm of assets in thousand won (Lnasset), as a 
proxy for home bias. While this measurement is popular with empirical researchers, we also 
test two other variables: the natural logarithm of market value of equity in thousand won 
(Lnequity); and a binary variable for export-oriented firms, set to one if a firm’s ratio of 
export sales to total sales is greater than the mean value for the sample and zero otherwise 
(Export2Sales).  
The results in Table 5 support the home bias proposition for foreign investors, particularly 
when log of assets (columns 1-2) and log of equity value (columns 3-4) proxy for the size of 
the firm. The magnitude of the coefficient of firm size in our estimation of 3.65 implies that 
the elasticity of foreign ownership with respect to Lnasset is about 0.52 (=3.65/7.06), which 
is similar to the findings of Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2009) for 29 selected countries, Tesar 
and Werner (1995) for Sweden, and Kang and Stulz (1997) for Japan. The size of the firm, 
proxied by a high level of exports, is insignificant for foreign investors. 
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In addition, the results in Table 5 indicate that research hypothesis H1 is robust even when 
we control for the foreign investors’ home bias factors. The estimated coefficients of the 
corporate governance variable are consistently significant regardless of model specifications 
(columns 1-6). The magnitudes of the coefficients are also somewhat similar (models 1-3) or 
smaller (models 4-6) than those estimations without controlling for the home bias factor in 
Table 2.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Further Analysis 
 Corporate governance, firm value and foreign ownership. In addition to the static 
effect through reduced risk, better corporate governance may lead to a dynamic benefit and 
enhance firm value. Better investor protection can improve a firm’s ability to raise external 
financing and reduce the cost of that financing. Therefore, investor protection can have a 
positive effect on growth, as witnessed by the policy recommendations of the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald 2004). Enhanced productivity is the state 
variable that leads to dynamic growth. Bartelsman and Doms (2000) point out that a firm’s 
(managerial) decisions, including input choices, are one of the determinants of its 
productivity. The corporate governance literature suggests that better governance will 
positively affect firm productivity by providing managerial incentives to improve allocative 
efficiency, input combination and productivity-enhancing investment at a lower capital cost 
(Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz 2007, Coffee 1984). Also, Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003) find 
that managerial performance enhances share value. 
We consider both Tobin Q and Productivity variables in the unrestricted baseline model. 
Tobin Q and Productivity are expected to capture firm value from the financial and real 
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perspectives. Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985), we calculate Tobin Q as market value of 
equity plus book value of debt divided by book value of assets. To overcome endogeneity 
problems arising from the OLS method, we estimate firm-level productivity following 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The advantage of Levinsohn and Petrin’s method, which is a 
modification of Olley and Pakes (1996), is that estimated productivity is free from 
endogeneity problems. It also avoids the discontinuity problem associated with the Olley-
Pakes method (detailed explanation available from authors). 
Tables 6 and 7 show panel estimations for both fixed and random effects (i.e., models 2-7 
in Table 2) and indicate that the significance of the corporate governance variable (Outside) 
remains largely intact even when we control for firm value and performance. Both Tobin Q in 
Table 6 and Productivity in Table 7 have the expected signs and are significant at the one 
percent level irrespective of model specifications.  
This finding implies that foreign investors value the outside director system itself, 
although firm value is also another important determinant of their investment decisions. 
Further, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients of Outside in Tables 6 and 7 are 
somewhat similar for fixed effects estimation and lower for random effects estimation than 
those from the unrestricted baseline estimation (i.e., without firm value variables) in Table 2. 
Considering that the estimated coefficients of Outside in Table 2 capture the total effects of 
improved governance including the indirect effects (i.e., confounding through firm value), 
these lower or similar magnitudes of the estimations suggest the positive improvement of 
governance-led firm value.14 This finding suggests that foreign investors will prefer to 
purchase shares in those firms that are large and have improved corporate governance.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
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 Reduction in outside directors and ownership. We examine the symmetry of the 
positive effect of the appointment of outside directors on foreign ownership and its negative 
impact on bank ownership. We expect that a reduction in the number of outside directors 
would lead to opposite effects on foreign (negative) and bank (positive) ownership. 
Od_minus is a binary variable set to one if the number of outside directors declined and zero 
otherwise.  
Yit = constant + β1 Od_minusit + β2 Book2Marketit + β3 Dividendit + β4 Leverageit 
+ β5 FinanDistrit + β6 ShareLiquidit + β7 CurrentRatioit 
+ β8 CSHsit + β9 CrossFirmit + Djt λjt + ωt νi + θt + εit (2) 
Although statistical significance is marginal, Table 8 (columns 1-3) indicates that a 
reduction in the number of outside directors negatively affected foreign ownership. We 
interpret this finding as providing additional support for the empirical hypothesis H1, 
suggesting that foreigners’ equity ownership will rise in a firm with improved corporate 
governance that protects minority shareholders and reduces investment risks. Below we will 
conduct a comparable test for bank owenership. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Corporate Governance and Bank Ownership  
As discussed in the Introduction, rent seeking theory and arguments that support the Anglo-
American system, suggest that the shift in corporate governance systems towards the outsider 
model may reduce the rents obtainable by banks. We examine whether bank ownership has 
responded negatively to the change from the traditional bank-oriented insider model towards 
the market-based outsider model. For the banks’ unrestricted baseline models, we also 
considered the size of the firm variable to compare the home bias proposition to foreign 
ownership. 
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Yit = constant + β1 Outsideit + β2 Lnassetit + β3 Book2Marketit + β4 Dividendit  
+ β5 Leverageit + β6 FinanDistrit + β7 ShareLiquidit + β8 CurrentRatioit 
+ β9 CSHsit + β10 CrossFirmit + Djt λjt + ωt νi + θt + εit (3) 
The estimated coefficients of the governance variable for bank ownership were negative, as 
predicted by hypothesis H3 but were not significant. As described earlier, bank-initiated 
corporate restructuring including debt-equity swaps increased banks’ ownership of 
corporations following the 1997 crisis. We believe this temporary increase in banks’ 
ownership attenuated the effect of Outside. The estimated coefficients of other variables for 
banks are generally more significant than those for foreigners.15 In particular, banks seem to 
be sensitive to a firm’s potential growth, proxied by Book2Market and Dividend, whereas 
foreign investors are not. Like foreigners, however, banks’ decisions to invest in shares 
respond positively to a firm’s stability (CurrentRatio). 
The positive but insignificant coefficients of controlling shareholders (CSHs) in the banks’ 
estimation (columns 3 and 6) in Table 9 provide, at best, weak support of the rent-seeking 
hypothesis. The results for cross-firm shareholdings (CrossFirm) are negative and highly 
significant (columns 3 and 6), consistent with the result for foreign ownership. This may 
imply that banks regard affiliates of a business group as competitors for their rents.  
The negative sign of the size of the firm in columns 1-3 may reflect the fact that large 
firms in Korea rely more heavily on the bond market, but the result is not significant. The 
significant signs on the two variables to reflect growth of the firm (positive for Book2Market 
and negative for Dividend) are consistent with bank ownership increasing with growth 
potential. The results also indicate that banks respond positively to highly leveraged 
companies, which is consistent with banks investing in firms with which they do business.  
Columns 4-6 replace Outside with the binary variable on decreases in outside directors 
(O_minus). Whereas the result on O_minus for foreign ownership in Table 8 was negative 
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and marginally significant, it was not of any significance for bank ownership.  This is not 
consistent with H3. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Endogeneity Issues 
We consider the system GMM estimation for two reasons. First, foreign investors’ 
investment decisions in Korea are likely to be a part of their global investment strategy. In 
other words, foreign investors’ change in corporate ownership is a function of the difference 
between this equilibrium ownership and actual ownership in the previous year. Then, we 
should include an autoregressive of the dependent variable (i.e., foreign ownership) in the 
estimation model. 
Second, while we note that the appointment of outside directors for listed companies on 
the Korea Exchange is a statutory requirement, the actual appointment of outsiders is not 
strictly exogenous. Given the underdeveloped market for independent directors, the 
government provided a grace period until the end of 2002. As a result, firms have a strategic 
choice toward the timing of appointing outside directors across the period until the end of 
2002. They may also exceed the number of appoitments required by regulations.  
Estimation results in Table 10 are based on the system GMM method (Roodman 2006; 
Blundell and Bond 1998; Arellano and Bover 1995). The results confirm that our main 
findings are qualitatively robust. The table illustrates that the estimated coefficients for the 
autoregressive dependent variables for foreign ownership (columns 3-5) ranged between the 
upper bound as indicated by OLS estimation (i.e., column 1) and the lower limit by fixed 
estimator (i.e., column 2). The suspected endogenous variable Outside remains significant. 
We regard the lagged dependents as well as Outside, Dividend and Leverage as endogenous 
variables in this system GMM estimation. Excluded instrument variables include binary 
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variables for year and industry classication, board ownership, log assets and log intangible 
assets. The Hansen and Arellano-Bond statistics also indicate that the instrument variables 
used for the estimation are valid, given the absence of autocorrelation in the first order.  
In a similar vein, we examine bank ownership (columns 6-7) and find results consistent 
with our findings reported above.16  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
----------------------------------- 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. We investigate the 
relationship between changes in corporate governance systems, specifically increases in the 
percentage of independent members on companies’ boards of directors, and foreign 
ownership. As foreign investment is strongly tied to globalization, our results show that 
corporate governance changes can stimulate globalization. The study is on regulatory changes 
in Korea, an emerging market, and should be applicable to other emerging markets in 
particular where attracting foreign investment is fundamental to achieving economic growth. 
We also extend our study in two other related contexts. We look into the implications of 
chaebols on foreign investment. We also study the effect of the move to more independent 
boards on bank ownership. 
Our results suggest that foreign investors place considerable value on the appointment of 
outside directors. The estimated coefficients imply that an increase in independent directors 
on a company’s Board of Directors attracts foreign investment. An increase from the low to 
the high quartile would increase foreign equity ownership by two percent. These estimated 
coefficients for outside directors remained intact even when we controlled for variables that 
would impact on the effectiveness of outside directors. We also confirm the robustness of this 
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finding by the estimation results from a symmetry assumption of a reduction in the number of 
outside directors and by the passing of endogeneity tests.  
Using the same research models, we tested for the effect of outside directors on bank 
ownership. The results supported a negative relationship, as hypothesized, but were never 
significant. We attribute this result in part to the temporary increase in bank ownership that 
resulted from corporate restructurings that followed the 1997 Asian Crisis. Thus, we were not 
able to confirm our third hypothesis.  
The governance variables are significant for independent firms irrespective of the model 
specifications we test, whereas those variables are not significant for chaebols. This suggests 
that foreign investors place greater value on the effectiveness of outside directors for 
independent firms than for chaebol affiliates, where the chairman is particularly influential. 
Our estimation results also support the home bias proposition for foreign investors. In line 
with the existing literature, foreign ownership elasticity with respect to the size of the firm 
(log of assets in thousand won) is around 0.52. In addition, the significance of the corporate 
governance variable is largely intact even when we control for firm value.  
The implication of our findings for globalization is that an improvement in the corporate 
governance system can facilitate capital mobility across countries. Therefore, our finding is 
especially relevant for an emerging market where a spread of capital costs between domestic 
and international markets exists. These findings are particularly important given that some 
(emerging) markets where investor protection is especially weak are also those markets for 
which capital investment from abroad is particularly important. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. See Bhagwati (2004) for a discussion of globalization. 
2. See Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) for a survey. 
3. The London Approach to restructurings focuses on avoiding debt write-offs rather than 
providing distressed companies with an appropriately sized balance sheet. 
4. A chaebol is a large, family-controlled business group similar to a keiretsu in Japan.  
5. Chaebol affilates’ average leverage, measured by book value of debt divided by book 
value of equity, was about 550 percent just before the onset of the crisis.  
6. In principle, investment in firms that have a good governance system will reduce banks’ 
monitoring costs. Given the situation in Korea during the sample period, however, we assume 
that the marginal benefits to banks due to reduced monitoring costs were minimal.  
7. Shares owned by individual households were the largest proportion, which is common in 
emerging markets (World Bank 2004) but declined from 64.6 percent in 1999 to 58.5 percent 
in 2003. This declining trend is similar to the experience in the UK and Japan, although 
Korean individuals still hold a much higher proportion than individuals in those countries.  
8. Equity ownership by executive officers has been an important issue in examining adverse 
selection issues in the US and developed economies (Sundaramurthy et al. 2005, Oswald and 
Jehera 1991, among others). Ownership by company executives in Korea however has been 
low. Also, stock options during our sample period were not common among executive 
officers in Korea.  
9. We find symmetric results when we use a profitability variable (Return on Assets - 
ROA) with slightly less statistical significance. 
10. These panal data analyses have an advantage over OLS because they can control for 
confounding caused by unobserved firm-specific effects. However, the random effect 
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estimator relies on the assumption of no correlation between this unobserved effect and the 
included regressors.  
11. The coefficient of outside directors in the OLS result is overestimated compared to the 
firm-specific panel models. This suggests possible correlation between the unobserved firm-
specific effects such as management style or corporate culture and the included regressors.  
12. In unreported results, we expanded equation (1) to include ‘beta’ from the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (using data for the previous 60 months) and standard deviation of returns to 
proxy for risk. Neither of the variables was significant. The average (median) beta for 1999-
2003 was 1.12 (1.08).    
13. We base our sample grouping between chaebol affiliates and independent firms on the 
KFTC classication in 2002.  
14. Note that both Outside and firm value have positive signs, and therefore the smaller size 
of net (i.e. direct) effects illustrates a positive association between the two variables. Note 
also that the appointment of outside directors is largely by government regulation rather than 
by improved firm value. We do not estimate the interaction variable between Outside and 
firm value because interaction variables between continous variables are difficult to interpret.  
15. Compare Table 9, column 3 with Table 5, column 2. 
16. In an unreported table, we find similar results when we exclude year-industry effects. 
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FIGURE 1 
Corporate shares owned by investor sectors (%) between 1999 and 2003 
 
 
 
This figure shows the equity share of a company owned by investor sectors including individual households, 
business corporations, foreigners, banks, insurance companies, securities companies and government and public 
enterprises. 
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TABLE 1 
Ratio of outside directors to total Board of Directors (BOD) and distribution of shares 
by owner (as percentages) 
 
 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Low 
quartile 
Median High 
quartile 
Max 
 
Outside director/BOD  
(N = 2817) 
  1999 
  2000 
  2001 
  2002 
  2003 
 
Outside director/insiders  
(N = 2817) 
 
 
23.52 
 
10.47 
22.53 
24.69 
27.54 
31.23 
 
43.69 
 
19.88 
 
15.79 
19.06 
19.45 
19.39 
19.04 
 
57.70 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
18.33 
25.00 
 
0.00 
 
25.00 
 
0.00 
25.00 
25.00 
28.57 
33.33 
 
33.33 
 
33.33 
 
25.00 
33.33 
33.33 
37.50 
40.00 
 
50.00 
 
88.89 
 
85.71 
81.82 
83.33 
83.33 
88.89 
 
500.00 
Shares owned by sector: 
(N = 2890) 
Foreigners  
 
  1999 
  2000 
  2001 
  2002 
  2003 
 
Banks  
 
  1999 
  2000 
  2001 
  2002 
  2003 
 
Individual households 
Other business corporations 
Security companies 
Insurance companies 
Government and public 
enterprises 
 
 
7.06 
 
5.82 
5.61 
6.37 
7.04 
9.26 
 
4.94 
 
4.98 
4.46 
4.56 
7.38 
2.34 
 
61.74 
20.35 
2.78 
1.38 
1.73 
 
 
 
12.84 
 
10.89 
11.56 
12.62 
13.06 
15.10 
 
10.20 
 
11.30 
11.33 
10.81 
10.09 
6.17 
 
26.16 
19.12 
6.44 
4.57 
7.08 
 
 
0.03 
 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.04 
0.07 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.49 
0.00 
 
41.84 
4.98 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
 
 
 
0.62 
 
0.76 
0.40 
0.50 
0.58 
1.00 
 
0.48 
 
0.54 
0.15 
0.53 
3.89 
0.09 
 
65.45 
14.47 
0.14 
0.02 
0.00 
 
 
 
7.10 
 
6.03 
4.67 
6.04 
7.16 
12.08 
 
4.92 
 
4.71 
2.79 
3.58 
10.28 
1.35 
 
83.88 
30.66 
1.94 
0.61 
0.15 
 
 
 
92.43 
 
75.53 
85.95 
82.94 
86.06 
92.43 
 
89.18 
 
88.54 
85.85 
89.18 
72.30 
72.69 
 
100.00 
99.99 
78.72 
99.48 
100.00 
 
 
BOD is the total number of board members. KLCA database reports banks’ ownership as the major component 
of financial institutions’ ownership. The ratio of outside directors to insiders and shares owned by individual 
households, other business corporations, security companies, insurance companies, and government and public 
enterprises are average values over 1999-2003. 
Minimum values are all zero. 
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TABLE 2 
Estimation results of unrestricted baseline models of foreign ownership 
 
 Pooled 
OLS Panel analysis: Fixed Effects Panel analysis: Random Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Outside 0.097 
[0.000] 
0.042 
[0.006] 
0.040 
[0.006] 
0.042 
[0.005] 
0.048 
[0.000] 
0.047 
[0.000] 
0.049 
[0.000] 
CSHs -0.031 
[0.097] 
 
-0.061 
[0.012] 
  
-0.052 
[0.006] 
 
CrossFirm -0.024 
[0.060] 
  
-0.060 
[0.002] 
  
-0.056 
[0.000] 
Book2Market -0.816 
[0.135] 
-0.171 
[0.152] 
-0.152 
[0.216] 
-0.154 
[0.151] 
-0.239 
[0.106] 
-0.215 
[0.132] 
-0.219 
[0.108] 
Dividend 0.017 
[0.006] 
0.002 
[0.455] 
0.003 
[0.358] 
0.003 
[0.369] 
0.004 
[0.156] 
0.004 
[0.114] 
0.004 
[0.118] 
Leverage -0.044 
[0.002] 
-0.004 
[0.625] 
-0.006 
[0.465] 
-0.010 
[0.217] 
-0.010 
[0.114] 
-0.013 
[0.043] 
-0.014 
[0.026] 
FinanDistr -3.489 
[0.000] 
-0.248 
[0.622] 
-0.467 
[0.354] 
-0.342 
[0.497] 
-0.599 
[0.153] 
-0.798 
[0.059] 
-0.698 
[0.099] 
ShareLiquid 0.187 
[0.002] 
0.027 
[0.373] 
0.021 
[0.496] 
0.023 
[0.444] 
0.049 
[0.065] 
0.040 
[0.129] 
0.044 
[0.091] 
CurrentRatio -0.005 
[0.009] 
0.003 
[0.092] 
0.003 
[0.095] 
0.003 
[0.108] 
0.002 
[0.269] 
0.002 
[0.276] 
0.002 
[0.351] 
N 2475 2482 2475 2482 2482 2475 2482 
2R  0.090 0.067 0.071 0.080    
rmse 11.940 5.214 5.051 5.177 5.986 5.828 5.943 
 
This table presents coefficients and p-values (in brackets) for tests of hypothesis H1 using pooled OLS (column 
1), Within Estimator (columns 2-4) and GLS random estimator (columns 5-7). The dependent variable is foreign 
ownership measured as foreigners’ share of a company’s total equity shares. Outside is the ratio of outside board 
directors to total directors; CSHs is the controlling shareholders’ ownership calculated as the number of CSHs’ 
shares divided by the total number of shares; CrossFirm is the cross-firm shareholding calculated as the number 
of shares owned by other business corporations divided by the total number of shares issued; Book2Market is 
the book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value per share over the year-end market price; Dividend is the 
dividend payout ratio calculated as cash dividend divided by net profit; Leverage is long-term financial distress 
measured as total liabilities divided by total assets; FinanDistr is short-term financial distress measured by a 
binary variable equal to one if a firm had losses for two consecutive years and zero otherwise. ShareLiquid is 
the cash-convertability of investment measured as the total value of shares traded over a year divided by the 
number of shares outstanding; and CurrentRatio is firm stability measured by the ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities. P-value is a cluster-correlation adjusted estimator for panel data analysis and heteroscedacity-
robust for OLS. Constants are not presented for brevity. rmse refers to root mean squared error. All estimations 
include Year effect and Year-industry effect. 
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TABLE 3 
Fixed effects estimation of corporate governance and foreign ownership for chaebols 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outside 0.013 
[0.667] 
0.024 
[0.378] 
0.013 
[0.670] 
0.024 
[0.372] 
0.014 
[0.645] 
0.025 
[0.366] 
CSHs 
  
-0.121 
[0.034] 
-0.121 
[0.021] 
  
CrossFirm 
    
-0.073 
[0.004] 
-0.067 
[0.006] 
Lnasset 
 
8.693 
[0.000] 
 
8.696 
[0.000] 
 
8.543 
[0.000] 
Book2Market -2.129 
[0.055] 
-2.512 
[0.039] 
-2.280 
[0.047] 
-2.664 
[0.036] 
-2.108 
[0.053] 
-2.487 
[0.043] 
Dividend -0.005 
[0.657] 
-0.009 
[0.411] 
-0.004 
[0.708] 
-0.008 
[0.447] 
-0.005 
[0.622] 
-0.009 
[0.389] 
Leverage -0.035 
[0.018] 
-0.026 
[0.099] 
-0.042 
[0.002] 
-0.033 
[0.036] 
-0.039 
[0.006] 
-0.030 
[0.077] 
FinanDistr -0.654 
[0.606] 
-0.508 
[0.634] 
-0.983 
[0.463] 
-0.837 
[0.455] 
-0.864 
[0.496] 
-0.703 
[0.508] 
ShareLiquid 0.022 
[0.752] 
-0.010 
[0.882] 
0.014 
[0.836] 
-0.017 
[0.786] 
0.017 
[0.802] 
-0.013 
[0.839] 
CurrentRatio 0.005 
[0.296] 
0.005 
[0.232] 
0.006 
[0.217] 
0.006 
[0.151] 
0.004 
[0.339] 
0.004 
[0.287] 
N 720 720 720 720 720 720 
2
R  0.115 0.177 0.134 0.196 0.128 0.187 
rmse 6.378 6.153 6.309 6.081 6.332 6.114 
 
This table presents coefficients and cluster-correlation adjusted p-values (in brackets) for tests of hypothesis 
H1a (chaebols vs. independent firms), using Within Estimator. Lnasset is the natural logarithm of assets (in 
thousands of won). Refer to Table 2 for the rest of the variables. Constants are not presented for brevity. rmse 
refers to root mean squared error. All estimations include Year effect and Year-industry effect. 
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TABLE 4 
Fixed effects estimation of corporate governance and foreign ownership for 
independent firms 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outside 0.054 
[0.001] 
0.053 
[0.001] 
0.049 
[0.001] 
0.048 
[0.002] 
0.054 
[0.001] 
0.053 
[0.001] 
CSHs   -0.022 
[0.275] 
-0.022 
[0.279] 
  
CrossFirm     -0.053 
[0.045] 
-0.051 
[0.057] 
Lnasset  1.228 
[0.243] 
 1.577 
[0.111] 
 0.793 
[0.452] 
Book2Market -0.062 
[0.414] 
-0.054 
[0.469] 
-0.043 
[0.584] 
-0.034 
[0.658] 
-0.055 
[0.442] 
-0.051 
[0.481] 
Dividend 0.004 
[0.198] 
0.004 
[0.215] 
0.005 
[0.164] 
0.004 
[0.182] 
0.005 
[0.131] 
0.005 
[0.144] 
Leverage 0.003 
[0.803] 
0.004 
[0.733] 
0.006 
[0.563] 
0.007 
[0.513] 
-0.004 
[0.726] 
-0.003 
[0.789] 
FinanDistr -0.133 
[0.793] 
-0.172 
[0.731] 
-0.320 
[0.504] 
-0.370 
[0.429] 
-0.158 
[0.760] 
-0.183 
[0.721] 
ShareLiquid 0.015 
[0.585] 
0.015 
[0.594] 
0.012 
[0.656] 
0.011 
[0.670] 
0.011 
[0.674] 
0.011 
[0.678] 
CurrentRatio 0.004 
[0.111] 
0.004 
[0.110] 
0.004 
[0.104] 
0.004 
[0.105] 
0.004 
[0.121] 
0.004 
[0.121] 
N 1762 1762 1755 1755 1762 1762 
2
R  0.059 0.060 0.055 0.058 0.071 0.071 
Rmse 4.580 4.576 4.337 4.329 4.550 4.549 
 
This table presents coefficients and cluster-correlation adjusted p-values (in brackets) for tests of hypothesis 
H1a (chaebols vs. independent firms), using Within Estimator. Lnasset is the natural logarithm of assets (in 
thousands of won). Refer to Table 2 for the rest of the variables. Constants are not presented for brevity. rmse 
refers to root mean squared error. All estimations include Year effect and Year-industry effect. 
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TABLE 5 
Fixed effects estimation of home bias proposition and foreign investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outside 0.042 
[0.004] 
0.041 
[0.004] 
0.039 
[0.008] 
0.038 
[0.009] 
0.042 
[0.006] 
0.040 
[0.006] 
CSHs 
 
-0.045 
[0.084] 
 
-0.051 
[0.056] 
 
-0.043 
[0.111] 
CrossFirm 
 
-0.044 
[0.035] 
 
-0.060 
[0.005] 
 
-0.052 
[0.013] 
Lnasset 3.657 
[0.000] 
3.627 
[0.000] 
    
Lnequity 
  
1.970 
[0.000] 
2.176 
[0.000] 
  
Export2Sales 
    
0.340 
[0.730] 
0.297 
[0.757] 
Book2Market -0.145 
[0.207] 
-0.119 
[0.293] 
-0.060 
[0.635] 
-0.013 
[0.925] 
-0.172 
[0.154] 
-0.144 
[0.209] 
Dividend 0.002 
[0.631] 
0.002 
[0.479] 
0.003 
[0.378] 
0.004 
[0.231] 
0.002 
[0.449] 
0.003 
[0.310] 
Leverage 0.000 
[0.966] 
-0.005 
[0.458] 
0.015 
[0.283] 
0.011 
[0.414] 
-0.004 
[0.637] 
-0.010 
[0.200] 
FinanDistr -0.302 
[0.530] 
-0.567 
[0.241] 
0.341 
[0.509] 
0.110 
[0.833] 
-0.261 
[0.605] 
-0.528 
[0.297] 
ShareLiquid 0.022 
[0.457] 
0.014 
[0.637] 
0.012 
[0.666] 
0.000 
[0.991] 
0.028 
[0.370] 
0.019 
[0.529] 
CurrentRatio 0.004 
[0.080] 
0.003 
[0.092] 
0.004 
[0.053] 
0.004 
[0.055] 
0.003 
[0.092] 
0.003 
[0.100] 
N 2482 2475 2482 2475 2482 2475 
2
R  0.083 0.097 0.098 0.120 0.067 0.080 
rmse 5.170 4.981 5.128 4.917 5.215 5.026 
 
This table presents coefficients and cluster-correlation adjusted p-values (in brackets) for tests of hypothesis H2 
(home bias proposition) using Within Estimator. Lnasset is the natural logarithm of asset (in thousands of won); 
Lnequity is calculated as the natural logarithm of market value of equity; Export2Sales is a binary variable for 
export-oriented firms calculated by unity if a firm’s export sales as a percent of total sales are greater than mean 
value and zero otherwise. Refer to Table 2 for the rest of the variables. Constants are not presented for brevity. 
rmse refers to root mean squared error. All estimations include Year effect and Year-industry effect. 
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TABLE 6 
Fixed effects estimation of corporate governance, Tobin Q and foreign ownership 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outside 0.043 
[0.005] 
0.043 
[0.003] 
0.041 
[0.005] 
0.042 
[0.003] 
0.043 
[0.004] 
0.043 
[0.003] 
CSHs 
  
-0.062 
[0.011] 
-0.061 
[0.009] 
  
CrossFirm 
    
-0.062 
[0.001] 
-0.055 
[0.004] 
TobinQ 2.161 
[0.000] 
2.255 
[0.000] 
2.193 
[0.000] 
2.292 
[0.000] 
2.238 
[0.000] 
2.314 
[0.001] 
Lnasset 
 
3.791 
[0.000] 
 
4.044 
[0.000] 
 
3.437 
[0.001] 
Book2Market -0.132 
[0.158] 
-0.103 
[0.235] 
-0.112 
[0.245] 
-0.081 
[0.373] 
-0.112 
[0.168] 
-0.088 
[0.264] 
Dividend 0.003 
[0.329] 
0.002 
[0.474] 
0.004 
[0.246] 
0.003 
[0.382] 
0.004 
[0.252] 
0.003 
[0.380] 
Leverage -0.021 
[0.057] 
-0.016 
[0.108] 
-0.023 
[0.038] 
-0.019 
[0.061] 
-0.027 
[0.008] 
-0.022 
[0.028] 
FinanDistr -0.241 
[0.638] 
-0.296 
[0.542] 
-0.460 
[0.370] 
-0.524 
[0.280] 
-0.338 
[0.509] 
-0.377 
[0.441] 
ShareLiquid 0.029 
[0.305] 
0.024 
[0.391] 
0.023 
[0.428] 
0.017 
[0.546] 
0.025 
[0.377] 
0.020 
[0.461] 
CurrentRatio 0.004 
[0.058] 
0.004 
[0.049] 
0.004 
[0.061] 
0.004 
[0.053] 
0.004 
[0.066] 
0.004 
[0.058] 
N 2482 2482 2475 2475 2482 2482 
2
R  0.080 0.097 0.086 0.106 0.094 0.108 
rmse 5.177 5.130 5.012 4.956 5.138 5.099 
 
This table reports coefficients and cluster-correlation adjusted p-values (in brackets) for tests of hypotheses H1 
and H2 after controlling for the firm value. TobinQ represents the firm value calculated by adding market value 
of equity and book value of debt and dividing by book value of assets. Refer to Table 2 for the other variables. 
Constants are not presented for brevity. rmse refers to root mean squared error. All estimations include Year 
effect and Year-industry effect. 
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TABLE 7 
Fixed effects estimation of corporate governance, productivity and foreign ownership 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outside 0.042 
[0.019] 
0.042 
[0.018] 
0.042 
[0.017] 
0.042 
[0.016] 
0.042 
[0.018] 
0.042 
[0.018] 
CSHs 
  
-0.035 
[0.273] 
-0.038 
[0.238] 
  
CrossFirm 
    
-0.038 
[0.038] 
-0.037 
[0.048] 
Productivity 2.389 
[0.000] 
2.293 
[0.001] 
2.380 
[0.000] 
2.271 
[0.001] 
2.290 
[0.001] 
2.216 
[0.001] 
Lnasset 
 
1.141 
[0.356] 
 
1.274 
[0.308] 
 
0.933 
[0.455] 
Book2Market -0.113 
[0.198] 
-0.107 
[0.224] 
-0.099 
[0.255] 
-0.091 
[0.299] 
-0.106 
[0.210] 
-0.101 
[0.233] 
Dividend 0.005 
[0.297] 
0.004 
[0.335] 
0.005 
[0.275] 
0.005 
[0.313] 
0.005 
[0.264] 
0.005 
[0.298] 
Leverage 0.001 
[0.858] 
0.002 
[0.682] 
-0.001 
[0.894] 
0.001 
[0.930] 
-0.002 
[0.737] 
-0.001 
[0.883] 
FinanDistr -0.955 
[0.070] 
-0.980 
[0.059] 
-1.014 
[0.060] 
-1.047 
[0.047] 
-0.988 
[0.066] 
-1.007 
[0.057] 
ShareLiquid 0.047 
[0.037] 
0.043 
[0.052] 
0.043 
[0.052] 
0.038 
[0.079] 
0.044 
[0.051] 
0.041 
[0.064] 
CurrentRatio 0.004 
[0.097] 
0.004 
[0.097] 
0.004 
[0.130] 
0.004 
[0.134] 
0.004 
[0.114] 
0.004 
[0.115] 
N 1520 1520 1516 1516 1520 1520 
2
R  0.083 0.085 0.085 0.087 0.089 0.090 
rmse 4.362 4.359 4.363 4.359 4.348 4.346 
 
This table reports coefficients and cluster-correlation adjusted p-values (in brackets) for tests of hypotheses H1 
and H2 after controlling for the firm value. Productivity represents the firm value based on estimation of 
productivity function following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Olley and Pakes (1995). Refer to Table 2 for 
the other variables. Constants are not presented for brevity. rmse refers to root mean squared error. All 
estimations include Year effect and Year-industry effect. 
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TABLE 8 
Fixed effects estimation of reduction in outside directors and foreign ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Od_minus -0.800 
[0.096] 
-0.824 
[0.085] 
-0.741 
[0.122] 
CSHs 
 
-0.059 
[0.017] 
 
CrossFirm 
  
-0.059 
[0.002] 
Book2Market -0.206 
[0.102] 
-0.186 
[0.154] 
-0.189 
[0.095] 
Dividend 0.003 
[0.366] 
0.003 
[0.282] 
0.003 
[0.291] 
Leverage -0.007 
[0.452] 
-0.008 
[0.368] 
-0.012 
[0.134] 
FinanDistr -0.144 
[0.772] 
-0.360 
[0.469] 
-0.237 
[0.633] 
ShareLiquid 0.024 
[0.425] 
0.018 
[0.553] 
0.020 
[0.501] 
CurrentRatio 
  
0.004 
[0.075] 
0.004 
[0.078] 
0.003 
[0.090] 
N 2482 2475 2482 
2
R  0.060 0.065 0.073 
rmse 5.233 5.069 5.198 
 
This table reports coefficients and cluster-correlation adjusted p-values (in brackets) for a roubustness check. 
Od_minus is a binary variable given the value unity if the number of outside directors declined and zero 
otherwise. Refer to Table2 for the other variables. Constants are not presented for brevity. rmse refers to root 
mean squared error. All estimations include Year effect and Year-industry effect. 
46 
 
TABLE 9 
Fixed effects estimation of corporate governance and banks’ ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outside -0.008 
[0.660] 
-0.010 
[0.604] 
-0.010 
[0.594] 
   
Od_minus 
   
-0.010 
[0.987] 
0.004 
[0.995] 
0.142 
[0.821] 
Lnasset -2.056 
[0.321] 
-2.075 
[0.307] 
-2.881 
[0.159] 
   
Book2Market 0.711 
[0.000] 
0.689 
[0.000] 
0.704 
[0.000] 
0.732 
[0.000] 
0.712 
[0.000] 
0.732 
[0.000] 
Dividend -0.004 
[0.046] 
-0.005 
[0.022] 
-0.004 
[0.044] 
-0.005 
[0.025] 
-0.006 
[0.013] 
-0.005 
[0.020] 
Leverage 0.031 
[0.113] 
0.037 
[0.111] 
0.027 
[0.158] 
0.035 
[0.069] 
0.040 
[0.075] 
0.031 
[0.084] 
FinanDistr -1.429 
[0.214] 
-1.306 
[0.260] 
-1.415 
[0.202] 
-1.477 
[0.202] 
-1.362 
[0.241] 
-1.479 
[0.185] 
ShareLiquid -0.037 
[0.334] 
-0.030 
[0.431] 
-0.034 
[0.351] 
-0.039 
[0.280] 
-0.033 
[0.374] 
-0.037 
[0.290] 
CurrentRatio 0.009 
[0.021] 
0.009 
[0.019] 
0.009 
[0.020] 
0.009 
[0.022] 
0.009 
[0.020] 
0.009 
[0.022] 
CSHs 
 
0.062 
[0.290] 
0.104 
[0.087] 
 
0.062 
[0.298] 
0.102 
[0.099] 
CrossFirm 
  
-0.125 
[0.000] 
  
-0.119 
[0.000] 
N 2482 2475 2475 2482 2475 2475 
2
R  0.078 0.083 0.120 0.075 0.080 0.113 
rmse 6.260 6.251 6.126 6.272 6.263 6.149 
 
This table reports coefficients and cluster-correlation adjusted p-values (in brackets) for tests of hypothesis H3, 
using Within Estimator. Outside is the ratio of outside directors to board members, and Od_minus is a binary 
variable given the value unity if the number of outside directors declined and zero otherwise. Refer to Table 2 
for the other variables. Constants are not presented for brevity. rmse refers to root mean squared error. All 
estimations include Year effect and Year-industry effect. 
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TABLE 10 
System GMM estimation of foreign ownership and banks’ ownership 
 
 
OLS 
(1) 
Foreigners 
Fixed effect 
(2) 
Foreigners 
System GMM 
(3) 
Foreigners 
(4) 
Foreigners 
(5) 
Foreigners 
(6) 
Banks 
(7) 
Banks 
L.Foreigners 0.882 
[0.000] 
0.221 
[0.000] 
0.782 
[0.000] 
0.779 
[0.000] 
0.782 
[0.000]   
L.Banks 
     
0.473 
[0.000] 
0.484 
[0.000] 
Outside 0.037 
[0.000] 
0.038 
[0.000] 
0.076 
[0.031] 
0.088 
[0.013] 
0.078 
[0.034] 
0.455 
[0.900] 
-0.853 
[0.819] 
CSHs -0.001 
[0.905] 
-0.021 
[0.222]  
-0.009 
[0.680]  
-0.051 
[0.289]  
CrossFirm -0.017 
[0.029] 
-0.052 
[0.000]   
-0.007 
[0.765]  
0.058 
[0.025] 
Book2Market -0.527 
[0.190] 
-0.287 
[0.386] 
-0.965 
[0.393] 
-0.887 
[0.425] 
-1.020 
[0.400] 
-1.553 
[0.161] 
-1.169 
[0.213] 
Dividend 0.004 
[0.167] 
0.003 
[0.335] 
0.004 
[0.566] 
0.005 
[0.552] 
0.004 
[0.569] 
-0.016 
[0.158] 
-0.015 
[0.146] 
Leverage -0.007 
[0.233] 
-0.012 
[0.165] 
0.027 
[0.291] 
0.013 
[0.612] 
0.026 
[0.341] 
-0.014 
[0.567] 
-0.014 
[0.527] 
FinanDistr -1.454 
[0.000] 
-0.543 
[0.305] 
-6.254 
[0.001] 
-5.725 
[0.004] 
-6.352 
[0.001] 
6.675 
[0.015] 
6.522 
[0.019] 
ShareLiquid 0.057 
[0.013] 
0.026 
[0.305] 
0.264 
[0.032] 
0.224 
[0.156] 
0.253 
[0.032] 
-0.269 
[0.046] 
-0.221 
[0.125] 
CurrentRatio -0.002 
[0.129] 
0.003 
[0.121] 
-0.014 
[0.004] 
-0.015 
[0.005] 
-0.015 
[0.004] 
0.017 
[0.064] 
0.013 
[0.134] 
Hansen  n.a. n.a. 0.253 0.297 0.289 0.114 0.065 
Arellano-
Bond: m1 n.a. n.a. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-
Bond: m2 n.a. n.a. 0.141 0.146 0.129 0.839 0.976 
N 2429 2429 1972 1972 1972 1827 1827 
This table reports the system GMM estimation for foreign ownership (columns 3-5) and bank ownership 
(columns 6-7), OLS (column 1) and fixed-effect (column 2) of foreign ownership. Estimated coefficients and 
heteroskedacity-adjusted p-values (brackets) are presented. L.Foreigners (L.Banks) denotes one-lagged foreign 
(banks) ownership. L.Foreigner (L.Banks), Outside, Dividend and Leverage are instrumented. Excluded 
instrument variables include binary variables for year and industry classication, board ownership, log asset and 
log intangible asset for Model (1)-(5); and year and industry classication, board ownership for Model (6)-(7). 
Both Hansen and Arellano-Bond statistics are p-values. All estimations include Year effect and Year-industry 
effect. 
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